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INTRODUCTION
In 1968, the United States Army Corps of Engineers finished
constructing the seventy-six-mile Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet
(MR-GO) navigational channel.1 Congress authorized the Army
Corps of Engineers to begin construction to create a shipping route
between New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico.2 However, the MR-
GO also caused significant erosion and other environmental detri-
ments that greatly increased the risk of flooding around its vicinity.3
The Army Corps of Engineers learned about many of these detri-
ments and risks through numerous studies it conducted between
1998 and 2005, but never fully addressed them.4
Hurricane Katrina eventually showcased the MR-GO’s defects in
violent fashion. The MR-GO severely worsened Hurricane Katrina’s
effects5 and Louisiana landowners resultingly incurred catastrophic
flood damages.6 To make matters worse, many injured landowners
who sought compensation from the federal government for its con-
struction of and failure to maintain the MR-GO instead experienced
protracted and ultimately unsuccessful litigation.7
Unfortunately, an array of other powerful hurricanes and tropical
storms in recent years have also brought devastation8 and repeat-
edly sounded the alarm on an uncomfortable scientific truth9: sea
1. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687, 691, 698, 702 (2015), rev’d,
887 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 796 (2019). The MR-GO, its role in ag-
gravating flood damages in Hurricane Katrina, and the resulting litigation are discussed in
more detail in Part III.
2. See St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 796 (2019).
3. See, e.g., id. at 1358.
4. See id.; St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 704-09, 720-23.
5. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 2012).
6. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 690-91.
7. See infra Part III.C.
8. See Oliver Milman, From Harvey to Michael: How America’s Year of Major Hurricanes
Unfolded, GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/
oct/15/us-year-of-hurricanes-extreme-michael-irma-florence [https://perma.cc/X8FG-QBRU].
9. See Henry Fountain, The Hurricanes, and Climate-Change Questions, Keep Coming.
Yes, They’re Linked., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/climate/
hurricane-michael-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/C3VK-Q5P2].
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levels are rising10 and causing substantial flooding.11 Though the
federal government has attempted lofty infrastructure projects to
address rising sea levels throughout the years, many of these proj-
ects have suffered from mismanagement and a dearth of basic main-
tenance.12 Indeed, some projects originally built to prevent flooding
have instead intensified it.13 When an infrastructure project actually
causes more severe flood damages than would have occurred with-
out its construction, how might an affected property owner win com-
pensation from the federal government?
A property owner who sues the federal government in tort will
almost certainly fail, considering that one cannot sue the federal
government unless the federal government consents to being sued.14
With this in mind, some litigants have instead alleged that govern-
ment-induced flooding amounts to a taking compensable under the
Fifth Amendment.15 Variations of this recovery method’s theoretical
underpinnings have received much scholastic attention in recent
years.16 Nonetheless, in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v.
10. See Chris Mooney, At This Rate, Earth Risks Sea Level Rise of 20 to 30 Feet, Historical
Analysis Shows, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-
environment/2018/ 09/20/antarctica-warming-could-fuel-disastrous-sea-level-rise-study-finds/
[https://perma.cc/PA4L-KQJ6].
11. See Abbie Bennett, Florence Floods Damaged Thousands More Homes Because of Sea
Level Rise, Study Shows, NEWS & OBSERVER (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.newsobserver.com/
news/local/ article218944875.html [https://perma.cc/MH6R-DE56]; Andrew Freedman, Study:
Sea Level Rise Boosted Hurricane Florence’s Coastal Flooding, AXIOS (Sept. 24, 2018),
https://www.axios.com/ sea-level-rise-hurricane-florence-coastal-flooding-a32d013f-5b66-470a-
9536-7a54c3001d64.html [https://perma.cc/B4TG-VGW4]; see also Peter Kotecki, One of
California’s Most Famous Surf Towns Is Threatened by Rising Sea Levels That Could Over-
take Beaches and Million-Dollar Homes, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/santa-cruz-california-is-threatened-by-accelerating-sea-level-rise-2018-10
[https://perma.cc/P75G-ZZDF].
12. See Todd C. Frankel, Taming the Mighty Mississippi, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/mississippi-river-infrastructure/
[https://perma.cc/C7M8-7CLC]; Mark Hand, Massive Levee Failure near Houston Exposes
Danger of Crumbling Infrastructure, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 30, 2017), https://think prog-
ress.org/infrastructure-no-match-for-harvey-430235bd32df/ [https://perma.cc/Z2TG-XHFV].
13. See Adam Rogers, Too Much Engineering Has Made Mississippi River Floods Worse,
WIRED (Apr. 4, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/too-much-engineering-has-made-
mississippi-river-floods-worse/ [https://perma.cc/28YS-BMRZ].
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 26-27 (2012); St.
Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139
S. Ct. 796 (2019).
16. See infra Part V.A.
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United States, the Supreme Court asserted that due to “the nearly
infinite variety of ways in which government actions or regulations
can affect property interests,” lower courts may not categorically
dismiss such claims via bright-line rules.17 Instead, courts must
apply fact-intensive inquiries.18
Arkansas Game’s proscription against categorical dismissals
means that litigants will likely continue to raise takings claims that
arise from government-induced flooding.19 One essential element of
these claims is causation. Causation can be especially difficult to
calculate because the federal government has already completed a
myriad of infrastructure developments and continues to undertake
ambitious projects.20 Given that one project’s beneficial aspects
might offset another project’s detrimental effects,21 how can a court
best determine whether the federal government sufficiently caused
a litigant’s property damages?
This Note contends that federal courts adjudicating takings
claims that arise from government-induced flooding should employ
a fact-specific causation inquiry that weighs certain factors to decide
“whether the totality of the government’s actions caused the in-
jury.”22 To this end, this Note suggests that courts weigh (1) addi-
tional “risk-increasing and risk-decreasing government actions,”23
(2) their relation to the primary infrastructure project that allegedly
induced flooding,24 and (3) the time that has elapsed between each
additional project’s construction. 
17. 568 U.S. at 31, 37.
18. Id. at 37.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See Arpan Lobo, Bipartisan Water Resources Bill Passes Congress, President Trump
Expected to Sign, CAP. J. (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.capjournal.com/news/bipartisan-water-
resourcesbill-passes-congress-president-trump-expected-to/article_ a1974620-cdd0-11e8-8c9a-
533e7d8860e5.html [https://perma.cc/2D6U-KHRD].
21. See St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2018),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 796 (2019) (holding that plaintiffs may not look to “isolated govern-
ment actions” that caused their injury, but rather must look to “the whole of the government
action” when raising a takings claim).
22. Id. at 1365.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 1366. (“When the government takes actions that are directly related to pre-
venting the same type of injury on the same property where the damage occurred, such action
must be taken into account even if the two actions were not the result of the same project.”).
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To help explain why litigants bring such takings claims in the
first place, Part I briefly reviews governmental tort immunity and
Takings Clause jurisprudence. Part II reviews the Supreme Court’s
2012 Arkansas Game25 decision and the arguments it rejected. Part
II concludes that litigants will continue to bring forth such claims
due to the Supreme Court’s refusal to draw bright-line rules. Part
III reviews the St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States
litigation and the divergent causation approaches taken by the
Court of Federal Claims26 and the Federal Circuit.27 Part IV first
analyzes important policy implications that should underlie a
causation calculus. Next, it looks to prior federal court decisions for
guidance. Part IV then suggests a causation framework that gives
courts flexibility to avoid unjust results and incentivizes the feder-
al government to proactively combat global warming’s malicious
effects. Part V addresses possible counterarguments and looks to
some recent scholarship concerning the theoretical viability of
similar recovery theories.
I. HOW WE GOT HERE
Before diving into their policy implications, it is important to
understand why plaintiffs bring takings claims regarding govern-
ment-induced floods in the first place. This Part briefly reviews the
federal government’s immunity from tort liability before reviewing
Takings Clause jurisprudence, wherein the federal government
lacks immunity.
A. Government Tort Immunity
The federal government enjoys substantial immunity from tort
claims, especially those that originate “from activities and events at
federal flood control projects.”28 Although a detailed inquiry into the
full scope of and the mechanics controlling the federal government’s
25. 568 U.S. 23 (2012).
26. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687, 724-38 (2015), rev’d, 887
F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
27. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1362-68.
28. Kent C. Hoffmann, Note, An Enduring Anachronism: Arguments for the Repeal of the
§ 702c Immunity Provision of the Flood Control Act of 1928, 79 TEX. L. REV. 791, 791 (2001).
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tort immunity is beyond this Note’s scope,29 a basic overview
provides helpful context to explain the increase in takings claims
which various judges and other legal scholars have argued look a lot
like tort claims.30
First, the sovereign immunity doctrine holds that the federal gov-
ernment is immune from damages liability that it does not consent
to.31 Although the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)32 opens the fed-
eral government to tort liability in many instances, its “discretion-
ary function exception” grants the federal government significant
protections.33 Indeed, the federal government is immune to any
claims “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of
a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused.”34 A governmental action is “dis-
cretionary,” and thus not subject to suit, when it (1) “involves an
element of judgment” and (2) is “based on considerations of public
policy.”35 Courts generally construe the discretionary function ex-
ception broadly.36
The Federal Flood Control Act (FCA) also provides substantial
tort immunity to the federal government. Per the FCA, “[n]o liability
of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any
29. For a helpful overview and critique of governmental tort immunity, see Lawrence
Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional Torts, and
Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 800-22 (2007); see also Jonathan R. Bruno, Note, Immunity
for “Discretionary” Functions: A Proposal to Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act, 49 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 411, 419-22 (2012).
30. See St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1360 (contending that plaintiffs’ action related
to floodings induced by the federal government’s “fail[ure] to maintain or modify a govern-
ment-constructed project may state a tort claim, [but] does not state a takings claim”); Sandra
B. Zellmer, Takings, Torts, and Background Principles, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 193, 195
(2017) (“[T]he vast majority of cases involving temporary physical occupations by flooding are
torts, not takings.”).
31. See Rosenthal, supra note 29, at 801.
32. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842, 843 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§
1346(b), 2671-2680 (2012)).
33. See Rosenthal, supra note 29, at 803-04.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
35. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991).
36. See CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34131, FLOOD DAMAGE RELATED
TO ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEER PROJECTS: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 2-3 (2011), http://
nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL34131.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UJ5-
8FXN] (“[T]he presence of choice and judgment may allow the discretionary function exception
to preclude any claim against the United States.”).
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damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place.”37 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, federal courts have generally concluded that the
FCA holds the federal government immune from negligence suits
seeking damages related to governmental flood control efforts.38
Though governmental tort immunity in the context of flooding
damages is not absolute,39 as stated above, litigants rarely succeed
on tort claims raised against the federal government for its role in
damages arising from flooding. In In re Katrina Canal Breaches
Litigation, for example, landowners40 raised several tort claims for
damages resulting from the federal government’s allegedly negli-
gent failure to maintain the MR-GO canal system.41 However, the
court held the federal government immune from each claim under
either the FCA42 or, for claims not immune under the FCA, under
the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.43 Indeed, in light
of both the FCA and the FTCA, plaintiffs seldomly avoid dismissal
of tort claims raised against the federal government for injuries
sustained from flooding related to federal activities.44
B. The Takings Clause as an Alternate Source of Liability
Although plaintiffs are generally barred from asserting tort
claims against the federal government for its alleged causal role in
flood damages, they have more leeway in raising claims via the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.
37. 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
38. Sarah Juvan, Note, The Federal Flood Control Act: Congressional Development of a
Modern-Day Ark, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 303, 305 (1996).
39. See, e.g., Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 437 (2001) (“[I]n determining
whether [FCA] immunity attaches, courts should consider the character of the waters that
cause the relevant damage rather than the relation between that damage and a flood control
project.”).
40. This lawsuit involved a different set of plaintiffs than those who filed suit in the St.
Bernard Parish Government v. United States litigation. See St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United
States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1362 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 796 (2019). See infra
Part III for a more detailed discussion of both the St. Bernard Parish litigation and the
related tort litigation in In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012).
41. 696 F.3d at 441-43.
42. Id. at 448.
43. Id. at 448-50.
44. See Zellmer, supra note 30, at 203.
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The Tucker Act45 grants jurisdiction to the United States Court
of Federal Claims over certain claims brought against the United
States, including claims “founded ... upon the Constitution” and
claims “for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sound-
ing in tort.”46 Courts presume that the federal government has
consented to suit on claims that fall within the Tucker Act’s scope.47
Fifth Amendment takings claims are included within the Tucker
Act’s ambit.48 Per the Takings Clause, “nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”49 The Takings
Clause is based upon the idea that “[w]hen the government physi-
cally takes possession of an interest in property for some public pur-
pose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner.”50
Indeed, the Takings Clause is “designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fair-
ness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”51
In addition to instances where the government actually condemns
property using its formal eminent domain power,52 plaintiffs may
also sue for compensation under the Takings Clause via inverse
condemnation claims that accuse the government of taking property
without formally asserting its eminent domain authority.53 Plaintiffs
bring takings claims arising from flooding related to the govern-
45. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491
(2012)).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983).
48. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946) (“If there is a taking, the claim is
‘founded upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and
determine.”); Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 80-81 (2005) (“[S]o long as there is some
material evidence in the record that establishes the predicates for a traditional takings claim
... a plaintiff succeeds in demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction in [the United States Court
of Federal Claims] based on the Tucker Act and the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.”).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
50. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31 (2012) (alteration in
original) (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 322 (2002)).
51. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
52. For an example of a government asserting its formal eminent domain authority, see
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005).
53. See Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing United States
v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)).
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ment’s construction of, or failure to maintain, an infrastructure
project via inverse condemnation takings claims.54
Certain governmental regulations constitute per se takings that
demand just compensation from the government, including perma-
nent, government-authorized occupations55 and governmental regu-
lations that diminish all of the land’s economic value.56 For a gov-
ernmental regulation that does not amount to a per se taking,
courts must conduct a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether a
compensable taking has occurred.57 In these situations, courts
should look to “‘a complex of factors,’ including (1) the economic im-
pact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions; and (3) the character of the governmental action.”58 Courts
may more likely assess takings liability when they can characterize
the property intrusion at issue as a physical invasion effected by the
government itself.59
As specifically related to flooding, the Supreme Court held in
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.60 that flooding induced by the govern-
ment can constitute a compensable taking.61 The Court later held in
United States v. Cress62 that “seasonally recurring flooding” induced
by the government can constitute a Fifth Amendment taking.63 More
recently, and most importantly for this Note,64 in Arkansas Game &
Fish Commission v. United States, the Court held that temporary
54. See, e.g., St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 796 (2019); see also Michael Pappas, A Right to Be Regulated?, 24 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 99, 104, 110 (2016); Zellmer, supra note 30, at 193, 204.
55. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
56. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
57. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 32 (2012).
58. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942-43 (2017) (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)).
59. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
60. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
61. Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 32.
62. 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
63. Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 32.
64. Federal courts have undoubtedly decided many more takings cases related to flooding
than this Note can feasibly cover. This Note focuses its analysis on the Arkansas Game deci-
sion and its effect on takings cases arising from temporary government-induced flooding
moving forward.
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government-induced flooding may also constitute a taking which
demands just compensation.65
To conclude, litigants damaged by flooding resulting from—or
worsened by—a government infrastructure project will likely not
succeed with any tortious lawsuit. However, unlike with tort claims,
the government is not readily immune from takings claims. This
therefore incentivizes litigants to allege an inverse condemnation
taking of private property compensable under the Fifth Amendment
even if their claim looks a lot like a tort claim.66
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Having reviewed why a litigant might raise a takings claim in-
stead of a tort claim against the federal government for temporary
flooding resulting from the federal government’s construction of or
failure to maintain an infrastructure project, it is now appropriate
to review Supreme Court precedent governing the viability of such
claims. This Part concludes by asserting that litigants will likely
continue to bring similar claims given the Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission decision.
A. The Supreme Law of the Land: Temporary Government-
Induced Flooding May Constitute a Taking
In Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that “recurrent floodings, even if of finite dura-
tion, are not categorically exempt from Takings Clause liability.”67
The plaintiff, Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (the Commis-
sion), owned 23,000 forested acres along Arkansas’s Black River and
operated a nature and hunting preserve.68 The Commission’s land
also contained various oak tree species “essential to the Area’s
character as a habitat for migratory birds and as a venue for
recreation.”69
65. 568 U.S. at 26-27. See infra Part II.A for a more thorough analysis of Arkansas Game
& Fish Commission v. United States.
66. See Zellmer, supra note 30, at 194-95.
67. 568 U.S. at 27.
68. Id. at 27.
69. Id.
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However, due to the United States Army Corps of Engineers’
approval of “planned deviations” from the Clearwater Dam in
Arkansas for several years, the Commission experienced significant
flooding.70 Such flooding destroyed timber, significantly changed the
land’s topography, and ultimately required costly renovations.71 The
Commission filed suit alleging that the Army Corps of Engineers’
deviations amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking.72
The United States Court of Federal Claims awarded the Commis-
sion $5.7 million in damages after it determined that the six years
of the Army Corps of Engineers’ planned deviations from the
Clearwater Dam caused “repeated annual flooding” that signifi-
cantly damaged previously flourishing forests.73 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit subsequently reversed,
holding instead that government-induced flooding may only consti-
tute a taking if the resulting flooding is “permanent or inevitably
recurring.”74
However, in a unanimous decision,75 the Supreme Court rejected
the Federal Circuit’s reasoning and reversed and remanded,
concluding that “government-induced flooding of limited duration
may be compensable.”76 Though the Court deferred to the trial court
to determine key issues such as causation, foreseeability, and
damages,77 it nonetheless affirmed that “[f]looding cases, like other
takings cases, should be assessed with reference to the ‘particular
circumstances of each case,’ and not by resorting to blanket exclus-
ionary rules.”78 Indeed, given “the nearly infinite variety of ways in
which government actions or regulations can affect property inter-
ests,” the Court confirmed that “no magic formula enables a court
to judge, in every case, whether a given government interference
with property is a taking.”79
70. Id. at 27-28.
71. See id. at 29.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 29-30.
74. Id. at 30-31 (quoting Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2011)).
75. Justice Kagan abstained. Id. at 40.
76. Id. at 26, 34, 38, 40.
77. See id. at 40.
78. Id. at 37 (quoting United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)).
79. Id. at 31.
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Arkansas Game thus rejected the notion that the federal govern-
ment is categorically immune from Takings Clause liability in the
context of even temporary flooding it induced.80 The federal govern-
ment can affect property interests in a “nearly infinite variety of
ways,” meaning that quick and easy bright-line rules governing
liability will not suffice.81
B. Litigants Will Continue to Bring Similar Claims
The Supreme Court’s proscription against a “blanket temporary-
flooding exception” to takings claims82 at the very least keeps such
claims on the table for litigants. This, combined with substantial
governmental tort immunity,83 means that litigants will likely con-
tinue to bring similar recovery theories to try to recoup losses
sustained from government-induced floods.84 However, Arkansas
Game provided little guidance for lower courts as to the required
causation framework.85 This lack of a set standard inevitably creates
uncertainty for both plaintiffs and the federal government. A more
predictable causation framework for lower courts to employ is thus
crucial for litigants moving forward. 
III. INCONSISTENT CAUSATION FRAMEWORKS ON DISPLAY:
THE ST. BERNARD PARISH LITIGATION
In 2005, real property owners in Louisiana who incurred severe
flood damages during Hurricane Katrina began a protracted legal
battle against the federal government for its construction of and
failure to maintain the MR-GO,86 a seventy-six mile navigational
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 34.
83. See supra Part I.A.
84. See, e.g., Zellmer, supra note 30, at 193 (“Landowners impacted by flooding have been
emboldened to pursue inverse condemnation actions by recent Supreme Court precedent,
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States.”).
85. See 568 U.S. at 40.
86. Note that while the Court of Federal Claims abbreviated to “MR-GO,” St. Bernard
Parish Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687, 691 (2016), rev’d, 887 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2018), the Federal Circuit instead abbreviated to “MRGO,” St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United
States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2018). This Note employs the Court of Federal Claims’s
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channel.87 The plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims
under the Tucker Act, asserting that flooding ultimately caused by
the MR-GO amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking.88 Though the
court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, the Federal Circuit re-
versed in 2018.89 In doing so, the two courts adopted different
causation frameworks.90
This Part first describes the lengthy factual background to the St.
Bernard Parish litigation before it reviews the decisions rendered
in the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit. Lastly, this
Part summarizes the current state of the law.
A. Factual Background
In 1956, Congress authorized the United States Army Corps of
Engineers to begin construction of the MR-GO navigation channel
in New Orleans to create a shipping route between New Orleans
and the Gulf of Mexico.91 The Army Corps of Engineers completed
construction of the MR-GO in 1968.92 Additionally, through the
Flood Control Act of 1965, and close in time to when the Army Corps
of Engineers finished constructing the MR-GO channel, Congress
also authorized the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane
Protection Project (LPV project).93 The LPV project led to levee
construction around New Orleans.94 Such levees were “designed to,
and did, reduce the risk of flooding in New Orleans.”95
Both construction and lack of proper maintenance of the MR-GO
led to substantial environmental detriments that increased the risk
of severe flooding in the MR-GO’s surrounding areas. First, the MR-
GO increased the salinity of local waters, which in turn destroyed
wetlands that had served as natural buffers against floods.96
abbreviation.
87. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 690-91.
88. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1358.
89. Id. at 1357-59.
90. See infra Parts III.B-C.
91. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1357.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1358.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 1357-58.
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Secondly, the MR-GO’s original designer decided against “armoring
its banks with foreshore protection,” which left them especially vul-
nerable to erosion.97 The erosion that followed led to increased water
passing through the channel at higher speeds.98 Finally, the MR-
GO “created the potential for a funnel effect,” which amplified
flooding.99 A 2006 Senate Report on Hurricane Katrina recalled
previous studies poignantly describing the MR-GO as a “‘superhigh-
way’ for storm surges or the ‘Crescent City’s Trojan Horse’ that had
the potential to ‘amplify storm surges by 20 to 40 percent.’”100
Moreover, the Army Corps of Engineers knew about at least some
of the problems associated with the MR-GO prior to Hurricane
Katrina. The Army Corps of Engineers and other governmental
entities conducted numerous studies between 1998 and 2005,101 and
the Army Corps of Engineers could have foreseen the MR-GO’s
detrimental effects by at least 2004.102 Nonetheless, the Army Corps
of Engineers made policy choices against making certain repairs to
counteract the MR-GO’s detrimental aspects.103
Hurricane Katrina eventually showcased the MR-GO’s underlying
flaws when properties in Louisiana’s St. Bernard Parish and New
Orleans’s Lower Ninth Ward experienced catastrophic flooding.104
“[I]nevitably recurring flooding” during Hurricanes Rita, Gustav,
and Ike also flaunted the MR-GO’s defects.105 The Army Corps of
Engineers finally closed the MR-GO in 2009.106
Following Hurricane Katrina, considerable litigation over the
MR-GO’s role in causing the flood damages ensued. In one batch of
litigation, property owners damaged by the severe flooding filed over
400 tortious lawsuits in the United States District Court for the
97. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687, 691 (2015), rev’d, 887 F.3d
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
98. See St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1358.
99. Id.
100. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 712 (internal citations omitted).
101. Id. at 704-09.
102. Id. at 720-23; see also St. Bernard Parish Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1358-59.
103. See, e.g., St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 722 (“The Army Corps’ policy was to
allow bank erosion of the MR-GO to continue unabated.”).
104. Id. at 690-91.
105. Id. at 691 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id.
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Eastern District of Louisiana.107 These tort plaintiffs alleged that
the MR-GO’s construction and operation violated both the FTCA
and Louisiana state negligence laws.108 Though the tort plaintiffs
initially won judgment at the lower court, the Fifth Circuit reversed
in 2012 and held that the federal government was immune from the
plaintiffs’ tort claims.109
Near the same time as the tortious lawsuits’ filings, however, a
different set of property owners110 in Louisiana’s St. Bernard Parish
and New Orleans’s Lower Ninth Ward filed suit under the Takings
Clause, asserting that “construction and operation of [the MR-GO]
and failure to properly maintain or modify it constituted a taking by
causing flooding damage to their properties.”111
B. The Court of Federal Claims Decision
The United States Court of Federal Claims entered judgment for
the St. Bernard Parish plaintiffs under the Takings Clause.112 The
court noted Arkansas Game’s instruction that floodings cases
brought under the Takings Clause “be assessed with reference to
the particular circumstances of each case and not by resorting to
blanket exclusionary rules”113 and concluded that “the Army Corps’
construction, expansions, operation, and failure to maintain the
MR-GO caused ... flooding on Plaintiffs’ properties that effected a
temporary taking under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.”114 The court specifically determined that the MR-
GO’s construction and lack of maintenance caused a temporary
taking that occurred from August 2005 to July 2009.115
107. Id.
108. Id. at 690-91. The 400 lawsuits were consolidated into one suit. Id. at 691. This
consolidated tortious lawsuit involved a different set of plaintiffs than those who sought relief
under the Takings Clause in the St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States litigation. See St.
Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1362 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
109. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 692.
110. See St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1362 n.6 (“[A]nother group of plaintiffs, who
owned land in the St. Bernard polder, originally sued in tort but lost.”).
111. Id. at 1358.
112. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 746.
113. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United
States, 568 U.S. 23, 37 (2012)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 744.
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After first determining that the Army Corps of Engineers could
have foreseen that the MR-GO would cause flooding,116 the court
turned to causation. The court’s causation analysis focused entirely
on the MR-GO’s role in exacerbating flooding, and did not attempt
to differentiate between the federal government’s affirmative acts
and failures to act.117 The court instead looked holistically at the
Army Corps of Engineers’ “construction, expansions, operation, and
failure to maintain the MR-GO.”118 The court pointed to five sources
that each stemmed from the MR-GO’s construction and lack of
maintenance: “increased salinity”; “increased habitat and wetland
loss”; “increased erosion”; “increased storm surge”; and the “funnel
effect” that the MR-GO created.119
The court also rejected the federal government’s argument that
Hurricane Katrina broke the causation chain as “an intervening and
unpredictable natural force.”120 Rather, the plaintiffs successfully
showed that the Army Corps of Engineers’ construction and lack of
maintenance of the MR-GO directly caused the flooding.121 The
court similarly rejected the federal government’s arguments that
“subsidence, sea level rise, or land loss,” or “economic development”
instead caused the damaging floods.122
In sum, after determining that the federal government could have
foreseen the flooding risk, the Court of Federal Claims determined
causation by looking holistically to the Army Corps of Engineers’
entire “construction, expansions, operation, and failure to maintain
the MR-GO.”123 By demonstrating that the significant flooding which
damaged their properties was the “direct, natural, or probable re-
sult of the Army Corps’ authorized construction, expansions, oper-
ation, and failure to maintain the MR-GO and not incidental or
consequential injury,” the plaintiffs sufficiently proved causation.124
116. Id. at 720-23.
117. See id. at 724-38.
118. Id. at 746.
119. Id. at 724-38.
120. Id. at 739-40 (internal citations omitted).
121. See id. at 740-41.
122. Id. at 741-44.
123. Id. at 746.
124. Id. at 740-41 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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C. The Federal Circuit Decision
The St. Bernard Parish plaintiffs’ success in the Court of Federal
Claims proved to be short-lived, however. The Federal Circuit re-
versed on the grounds that (1) governmental inaction cannot serve
as the basis for a takings claim and (2) the plaintiffs did not prove
that the Army Corps of Engineers’ construction and operation of the
MR-GO caused the flooding.125
In contrast to the Court of Federal Claims’s holistic method that
did not differentiate between affirmative acts and failures to act, the
Federal Circuit asserted that “failure to properly maintain or to
modify” the MR-GO did not constitute affirmative governmental
action.126 The Federal Circuit further declared that the federal gov-
ernment is only liable for takings claims arising from “authorized”
actions, not the federal government’s failure to act.127 Indeed, only
the MR-GO’s original construction and “continued operation” could
induce takings liability because they were “the sole affirmative acts
involved.”128
 As to whether the MR-GO’s construction and “continued opera-
tion” caused the plaintiffs’ injury, the Federal Circuit held that the
Court of Federal Claims erred as a matter of law in its causation
framework.129 The Court of Federal Claims did not consider the LPV
project’s role in reducing the risk of flooding and in offsetting the
flood damages that stemmed from the MR-GO and thus effected a
failure of proof.130 Rather than looking at a single governmental
infrastructure project in isolation, “the causation analysis must
consider both risk-increasing and risk-decreasing government ac-
tions over a period of time to determine whether the totality of the
government’s actions caused the injury.”131 Indeed, for causation
125. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
126. Id. at 1360.
127. Id. (quoting Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1338 (2005)).
128. Id. at 1362.
129. Id. at 1357.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 1365.
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purposes, “‘government action’ includes all of the government’s
actions.”132
Moreover, the “government actions must be directed to the same
risk that is alleged to have caused the injury.”133 Because the LPV
project sought to address the same flood risk that the MR-GO
exacerbated, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Court of Federal
Claims erred by not including the LPV project in its causation
calculus.134
D. The Current Law After St. Bernard Parish and Arkansas
Game
As stated earlier, Arkansas Game instructed lower courts that
“[f]looding cases, like other takings cases, should be assessed with
reference to the ‘particular circumstances of each case,’ and not by
resorting to blanket exclusionary rules.”135 Because the federal gov-
ernment can alter property interests in a “nearly infinite variety of
ways,” courts cannot apply a “magic formula” to determine whether
it has effected a compensable taking.136
Nonetheless, per the Federal Circuit’s St. Bernard Parish deci-
sion,137 only an affirmative, “authorized activity,” can give rise to a
compensable takings claim.138 Assuming such governmental action
has occurred, courts assessing causation must look to all “risk-
increasing and risk-decreasing government actions over a period of
time” directed to the same risk so as to determine whether the
“totality of the government’s actions caused the injury.”139
132. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Cary v. United States, 552 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2009)).
133. Id.
134. See id. at 1365-66.
135. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 37 (2012) (quoting United
States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)).
136. Id. at 31.
137. Because “the Federal Circuit is a court of national jurisdiction hearing every appeal
of every inverse condemnation claim against the United States,” this decision should govern
takings claims brought against the federal government, barring later reversal by the Supreme
Court. See Brief for Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, St.
Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d 1354 (No. 18-359).
138. See St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1360 (quoting Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States,
346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
139. Id. at 1365.
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The Federal Circuit’s distinction between action and inaction for
purposes of takings liability has generated ample criticism.140
However, given the large amount of scholarship already devoted to
both the distinction between tort and takings liability, and the in-
herent difficulty in differentiating between the two forms of liability
and between action and inaction,141 this Note focuses its analysis
solely on the Federal Circuit’s causation framework, assuming affir-
mative governmental action.
More specifically, this Note asks: along with the primary govern-
ment action that allegedly induced flooding, which other “risk-
increasing and risk-decreasing government actions”142 should courts
consider in their causation frameworks? Though the Federal Circuit
asserted that “‘government action’ includes all of the government’s
actions,” it nonetheless asserted that for causation purposes, gov-
ernment actions must be directed to the same risk that allegedly
injured the plaintiffs.143 To this end, how “direct” of a relation must
exist between each government infrastructure project considered?
Additionally, what “period of time”144 should a court consider when
assessing the totality of “risk-increasing and risk-decreasing
140. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d 1354 (No. 18-
359) (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s inaction rule ... provides the Government a potent tool to
arbitrarily manipulate and defeat viable takings claims.”); Brief for Cato Institute et al., supra
note 137, at 12 (“The Federal Circuit’s action versus inaction dichotomy is unworkable, is
contrary to established Takings Clause jurisprudence, and is flatly contrary to [the Supreme
Court’s] recent decision in Arkansas Game.”); Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12, St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d 1355 (No. 18-359) (“To
the displaced homeowners, it did not matter whether the flooding resulted from an act, an
omission, or a combination of acts and omissions—the consequence was the same: a
government policy resulted in the physical invasion of their property and displacement from
their homes.”); Robert H. Thomas, MR-GO, Katrina Flooding: Inverse Condemnation and
Schlimmbesserung at the Federal Circuit, INVERSECONDEMNATION.COM (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.inverse condemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2018/04/mr-go-katrina-flooding-
inverse-condemnation-and-schlimmbesserung-at-the-federal-circuit.html [https://perma.cc/
9QKN-A2T2] (asserting that the Federal Circuit’s St. Bernard Parish decision “adopts a
categorical rule that ‘inaction’ in maintaining [the MR-GO] results in a blanket exception to
takings liability” which “diverges from at least four other lower courts (... and the Supreme
Courts of California, Florida, and Minnestota [sic]), which conclude that government inaction
in the face of a duty to act supports an inverse condemnation claim”).
141. See infra Part V.A.
142. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1365.
143. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Cary v. United States, 552 F.3d 1373, 1377 n.* (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
144. Id.
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government actions”?145 Drawing strict dichotomies for each of these
considerations appears difficult.
IV. A SUGGESTED CAUSATION FRAMEWORK
The divergence in causation frameworks adopted by the Court of
Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit should perhaps not come as
a surprise. Indeed, because the Takings Clause does not spell out a
required causation framework, takings litigants frequently argue for
opposing causation formulas.146 This Part suggests a causation cal-
culus for takings claims within the government-induced flooding
context.
This Part first analyzes important policy concerns that underlie
causation frameworks in the realm of the Takings Clause. Then, it
looks to alternative approaches taken in previous cases for guid-
ance. Lastly, this Part proposes that courts employ a fact-specific,
case-by-case inquiry that weighs certain factors when assessing
“whether the totality of the government’s actions caused the in-
jury.”147 Specifically, courts should weigh (1) additional “risk-
increasing and risk-decreasing government actions,”148 (2) their re-
lation to the primary infrastructure project that allegedly induced
flooding,149 and (3) the time that has elapsed between each addi-
tional project’s construction. Such a framework adheres to guidance
from both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, and also
addresses the policy implications discussed below.
A. Key Policy Implications
The lack of a coherent and consistent causation framework for
claims brought under the Takings Clause creates uncertainty for
145. Id.
146. See Jan G. Laitos & Teresa Helms Abel, The Role of Causation When Determining the
Proper Defendant in a Takings Lawsuit, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1181, 1209 (2012).
147. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1365.
148. Id.
149. See id. (“When the government takes actions that are directly related to preventing
the same type of injury on the same property where the damage occurred, such action must
be taken into account even if the two actions were not the result of the same project.”).
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litigants.150 A more predictable framework will therefore encourage
more efficient litigation moving forward.
First and foremost, a causation framework should be grounded in
the Takings Clause’s original purpose—that is, “to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”151 A
causation framework should thus be flexible enough to avoid arbi-
trary and unjust dismissals where the federal government, for all
intents and purposes, induced the flooding which damaged the
plaintiff’s property.
For example, the St. Bernard Parish plaintiffs contended that the
Federal Circuit effected a causation standard that “the Government
cannot lose” when it included a project not related to the MR-GO
such as the LPV project in its causation calculus.152 They argued
that applying a causation method that sums the effects of all gov-
ernment infrastructure projects related to flood risk in the region
rather than focusing on the flooding’s primary cause leads to absurd
results.153 Indeed, “in the real world the Government did build the
[MR-GO] navigation channel; ... it did foresee, two decades before it
actually happened, ‘the possibility of catastrophic damage to urban
areas by a hurricane surge coming up’ ... but consistently decided to
do nothing.”154 Because the LPV levees would have survived Hurri-
cane Katrina “long enough to prevent the inundation of Petitioners’
properties” and because “Petitioners’ properties would not have been
flooded by Katrina if [the MR-GO] had never been built,” a causa-
tion framework must focus on the MR-GO to comply with the
Takings Clause’s purpose.155
150. See Laitos & Abel, supra note 146, at 1183 (“The law surrounding [the Takings
Clause’s] causation requirement, though commonly litigated, is unsettled and therefore
uncertain.”).
151. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
152. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 140, at 28-29.
153. Id. at 29 (“[I]f the very purpose of a government is to protect an area from flooding
caused by hurricanes or other natural forces, it will always be the case that the flooding would
have occurred if the flood protection project did not exist at all.”).
154. Id. at 32 (citation omitted).
155. Id. at 29-30 (“The Federal Circuit’s new causation standard ... will only operate, as
here, to take private property for public use without just compensation.”).
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Moreover, given rising sea levels156 and the catastrophic damages
brought by floods, a causation framework should incentivize the
government to enact proactive measures. Therefore, perhaps a
court’s consideration of additional infrastructure projects removes
an incentive for the federal government to get the project right from
the start and to actively maintain it.
However, a causation framework that results in too much takings
liability has its own detrimental policy implications and could push
the federal government to avoid acting altogether. Over-expansive
Takings Clause liability “threatens to sweep away longstanding
government immunity rules, increase the liability burdens on
taxpayers at all levels of government, and seriously interfere with
elected officials’ good faith efforts to mediate competing social in-
terests in the use and control of property.”157 Indeed, a framework
that results in too much liability under the Takings Clause may
“produce a chilling effect [that] make[s] officials less likely to
restrict improvident floodplain and coastal development for fear of
takings claims.”158
As such, perhaps considering “risk-increasing and risk-decreas-
ing” actions taken by the federal government159 is essential to
incentivizing the federal government to take proactive steps in
preventing flooding. As the federal government argued, it “had no
obligation to construct the LPV in the first place, nor did it have any
obligation to bolster the LPV against any particular flood risks.”160
The federal government further contended that it constructed the
LPV “at significant taxpayer expense” to reduce the very same flood
risk the St. Bernard Parish plaintiffs attributed to the MR-GO.161
For both incentive and general fairness purposes, then, perhaps a
causation calculus must consider all government infrastructure
projects that affect the flood risk.
156. See, e.g., Coral Davenport & Kendra Pierre-Louis, U.S. Climate Report Warns of
Damaged Environment and Shrinking Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2018/11/23/climate/us-climate-report.html [https://perma.cc/G5NX-YGNM].
157. John D. Echeverria, Takings and Errors, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (2000).
158. Zellmer, supra note 30, at 194.
159. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
160. Brief for the United States in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8-9, St.
Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d 1355 (No. 18-359).
161. Id. at 9-10.
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Still, this Note contends that even if courts should consider addi-
tional “risk-increasing and risk-decreasing government actions over
a period of time”162 in the causation calculus, they would still need
to define the relevant “risk” and determine the length of time be-
tween such “risk-increasing and risk-decreasing” projects and the
primary project that allegedly caused flood damages.
In sum, a causation framework for takings claims that arise from
government-induced flooding must be flexible enough to allow liti-
gants just compensation. Moreover, the causation framework should
incentivize the federal government to take proactive steps towards
preventing flood damages. At the same time, courts must be careful
not to enact a regime that asserts governmental liability so quickly
that it chills governmental investment in infrastructure projects.
B. Approaches Taken in Prior Federal Court Decisions
As stated earlier, St. Bernard Parish is not the first court decision
to consider a takings claim that arose from government-induced
flooding.163 This Part looks to other decisions for guidance on the
proper causation frameworks for federal courts to employ.164
In Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, plaintiff Ridge Line, Inc.
(Ridge Line) alleged that the federal government’s construction of
a United States Postal Service facility caused “increased storm
drainage” which effected an inverse condemnation taking of Ridge
Line’s property.165 The Postal Service constructed a “check dam” to
combat the runoff, but it did not negate the problem the Postal facil-
ity’s construction created.166 Ridge Line ultimately sued under the
162. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1365.
163. See supra Part I.B.
164. Litigants may only bring takings claims against the federal government in the Court
of Federal Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012). However, various takings claims against
state governments in state courts have addressed both government-induced flooding and a
state’s failure to maintain an infrastructure project. See Arreola v. County of Monterey, 122
Cal. Rptr. 2d 38 (Ct. App. 2002); Jordan v. St. Johns County, 63 So. 3d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011). These cases provide interesting insights into state court takings jurisprudence, but do
not offer substantial guidance as to the proper causation calculus that a federal court should
apply.
165. 346 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
166. Id. at 1351.
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Takings Clause after the increased runoff forced it to pay to con-
struct and operate a flood control system.167
The Federal Circuit remanded and did not actually determine
whether Ridge Line had successfully proven a compensable takings
claim.168 However, the Federal Circuit directed the lower court to
consider on remand both “evidence that the government failed to
maintain the check dam it built” and additional indicia of whether
the government’s “actions (and inaction)” were reasonable.169 As
such, the Federal Circuit seemed to endorse the idea that a cau-
sation framework should consider other government actions in
addition to the primary act that allegedly induced the flooding. Still,
the Postal Service apparently constructed the “check dam” as part
of the overall Postal Service facility project.170 In total, Ridge Line
offers only limited guidance as to causation.
In John B. Hardwicke Co. v. United States, the plaintiffs sued
under the Takings Clause after the federal government induced
flooding from the Rio Grande River onto their property.171 The Court
of Claims rejected plaintiffs’ takings claim because “on the whole,”
the same project that caused the floods also “greatly enhanced” the
plaintiffs’ property.172 In support of its holding, the court cited the
“Miller Doctrine,” under which “a condemnor need not compensate
a landowner for value which the condemnor creates by the estab-
lishment of the project for which the landowner’s land is con-
demned.”173
At first glimpse, both John B. Hardwicke and Miller appear to
support the Federal Circuit’s causation approach in St. Bernard
Parish that looks to “both risk-increasing and risk-decreasing gov-
ernment actions over a period of time to determine whether the
totality of the government’s actions caused the injury.”174 However,
the Federal Circuit itself noted in St. Bernard Parish that neither
167. Id. at 1351, 1354.
168. Id. at 1359.
169. Id. at 1358.
170. Id. at 1351.
171. 467 F.2d 488, 488 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
172. Id. at 491.
173. Id. at 490 (citing United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943)).
174. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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were ultimately “relevant” because the federal government con-
structed the MR-GO before it constructed the LPV project.175
Moreover, as the St. Bernard Parish plaintiffs noted, in John B.
Hardwicke the federal government had “built two dams as part of
a single flood control project.”176 Therefore, “[i]t was thus unsurpris-
ing that the Court of Claims held that the effects of both dams must
be assessed in determining whether the project as a whole had
increased the natural flooding risk to which plaintiff’s properties
were previously exposed.”177
On similar grounds, the St. Bernard Parish plaintiffs cited City
of Van Buren v. United States178 for the proposition that “when the
Government ... relies only on ‘a listing of the public benefits that
flow from nearly all flood control projects,’ the Government cannot
defeat takings liability.”179 In City of Van Buren, the Federal Circuit
affirmed that government-induced flooding that damaged the
plaintiff city’s sewage lines amounted to a taking.180 The Federal
Circuit rejected the federal government’s argument that “substan-
tial benefits” arising from its flood-inducing action firmly out-
weighed the project’s detriments.181 Indeed, the court held that “a
recitation” of “a listing of the public benefits that flow from nearly
all flood control projects” was “insufficient to vitiate Van Buren’s
taking claim.”182 City of Van Buren thus rejected the federal gov-
ernment’s argument that a single project’s benefits and detriments
cancelled each other out for takings purposes,183 but neither con-
sidered, nor precluded the consideration of, the effects of other
government projects.
In sum, these previous cases seem to at least endorse the idea
that courts assessing causation should consider other governmental
actions that contributed to or detracted from the risk that the
primary infrastructure project allegedly created. Nonetheless, the
175. Id. at 1367 n.14.
176. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 140, at 37.
177. Id.
178. 697 F.2d 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
179. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 140, at 36 (quoting City of Van Buren, 697
F.2d at 1062).
180. 697 F.2d at 1059.
181. Id. at 1061-62.
182. Id. at 1062.
183. See id.
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additional “risk-increasing and risk-decreasing”184 projects were ap-
parently closely related to the government infrastructure project
that the plaintiffs targeted in their lawsuits. At a minimum, these
cases support the general notion that courts should also take into
account other government projects that are closely related to the
same risk as the flood-inducing government project.
C. A Suggested Causation Framework
Courts adjudicating takings claims that arise from government-
induced flooding should apply a fact-specific, case-by-case causation
inquiry that weighs certain factors in assessing “whether the total-
ity of the government’s actions caused the injury.”185 Courts should
weigh (1) additional “risk-increasing and risk-decreasing govern-
ment actions,”186 (2) their relation to the primary infrastructure
project that allegedly induced flooding,187 and (3) the time that has
elapsed between each additional project’s construction. To this end,
courts should grant the federal government more deference the clos-
er that the additional project relates to the primary project that
induced flooding. Courts should alternatively grant the federal
government less deference the longer the time that has elapsed
between construction of government infrastructure projects.
Sticking to a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry from the start
adheres with both Arkansas Game’s proscription against adopting
“blanket exclusionary rules”188 and the general purpose of the
Takings Clause—“to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.”189
Further, including other “risk-increasing and risk-decreasing
government actions”190 in the causation calculus will help avoid “a
184. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 1066 (“When the government takes actions that are directly related to pre-
venting the same type of injury on the same property where the damage occurred, such action
must be taken into account even if the two actions were not the result of the same project.”).
188. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 37 (2012).
189. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
190. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1365.
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chilling effect [that] make[s] officials less likely to restrict improv-
ident floodplain and coastal development for fear of takings
claims.”191 If a new infrastructure project’s “risk-decreasing” effects
can never mitigate Fifth Amendment Takings Clause liability
perhaps created by past projects, the federal government is presum-
ably less likely to incur the expenses to embark on the new project.
However, a court must weigh the relation between the “risk-
increasing and risk-decreasing government actions.”192 A “risk-
decreasing” structure enacted as part of the same overall scheme as
the infrastructure project that induced-flooding should weigh more
heavily in offsetting liability for the government than a project only
minimally related.193 Temporality should also factor heavily into a
court’s causation calculus. If a court considers a longer time period,
it will presumably also consider more potentially liability-offsetting
government projects in its calculus than if it looks to a more precise
time window.
As such, ignoring temporality and the relationship between each
project weighing factor risks enacting a liability that “the Govern-
ment cannot lose.”194 This Note’s proposed causation framework
avoids such a risk by granting less deference to the federal govern-
ment when a long time has elapsed between each government action
and when each government action is not closely related to each
other. Moreover, weighing the time and relation between govern-
ment actions will encourage the government to act quickly in enact-
ing proactive measurements to combat risks its past projects
created.
In sum, this Note’s proposed causation framework provides the
necessary flexibility for courts given “the nearly infinite variety of
ways in which government actions or regulations can affect property
interests.”195 However, the framework still balances competing inter-
ests between the federal government and private landowners by
weighing essential factors such as the different “risk-increasing and
risk-decreasing” projects the federal government constructed, the
191. See Zellmer, supra note 30, at 194.
192. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1365.
193. See id. (“To be sure, in determining causation, government actions must be directed
to the same risk that is alleged to have caused the injury to the plaintiffs.”).
194. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 140, at 28-29.
195. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31 (2012).
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time between those constructions, and the relation between each
project.196 Moreover, though this Note’s proposed causation frame-
work provides courts with consistent factors to weigh in each case,
it complies with Arkansas Game by not “resorting to blanket exclu-
sionary rules” that would hold certain claims “categorically exempt”
from Takings Clause liability.197
V. LIKELY COUNTERARGUMENTS
Most counterarguments to this Note’s proposed causation frame-
work will likely point to the need for a clearly defined dichotomy
between tort and takings liability. Such counterarguments will
likely argue that the federal government needs substantial tort
immunity in order to continue constructing important infrastructure
projects. One may alternatively criticize the Note’s framework for
allotting the federal government too much latitude.
A. Taking or Tort: Are These Lawsuits Theoretically Sound?
Takings claims arising from government-induced flooding, along
with other similar recovery theories, have generated substantial
academic criticism. Much of this criticism asserts that such “takings
claims” are, in reality, tort claims from which the federal govern-
ment is immune.198 To this end, substantial criticism centers around
the idea that government error or failure to maintain a project does
not constitute a taking.199 Professor John Echeverria writes, “If the
government commits an error ... there is no compensable taking
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.”200 Critics similarly
assert that if the government fails to maintain an infrastructure
196. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1365.
197. See Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 27, 37.
198. See, e.g., Zellmer, supra note 30, at 195 (“[T]he vast majority of ... temporary physical
occupations by flooding are torts, not takings.”).
199. See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 157, at 1080 (“[P]roperty owners have no equitable
claim, under the Takings Clause or on any other basis, to windfalls because of government
mistakes.”).
200. Id. at 1047.
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project it constructed, only tort liability—not takings liability—
should result.201
As such, one may argue that such takings claims should not be
brought in the first place, and that a causation framework should
work more quickly to dispel them. If a causation framework fails to
do so, one might contend, litigants will use the Takings Clause as a
way around governmental tort immunity. Indeed, a regime that
results in too much liability for the federal government under the
Takings Clause perhaps “threatens to sweep away longstanding
government immunity rules, increase the liability burdens on tax-
payers at all levels of government, and seriously interfere with
elected officials’ good faith efforts to mediate competing social
interests in the use and control of property.”202
Yet, various legal scholars also acknowledge that objectively
distinguishing between government torts and takings is an extreme-
ly difficult task in its own regard.203 Recent scholarship contends
that at least in some scenarios a government’s “failure to regulate,
or its failure to act to protect private property,” can give rise to a
Fifth Amendment taking, which demands just compensation.204
Although “[c]ourts and commentators frequently assert ... that the
Takings Clause is implicated only when the government changes
the law,”205 Professor Christopher Serkin writes that the govern-
ment sometimes becomes “so entangled in the substantive content
of property that the line between acts and omissions becomes es-
pecially blurry.”206
Therefore, sometimes “no principled basis exists for distinguish-
ing between regulatory acts and omissions” and liability under the
201. See St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1360 (“While the theory that the government
failed to maintain or modify a government-constructed project may state a tort claim, it does
not state a takings claim.”).
202. Echeverria, supra note 157, at 1049.
203. See Zellmer, supra note 30, at 201 (noting that “[c]ourts have long struggled to
distinguish takings claims from tort claims” and that those who attempt to define a clear
dichotomy between taking and tort “may find themselves stuck in a ‘Serbonian Bog’”).
204. Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property,
113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 346 (2014) (“[P]roperty owners could be constitutionally entitled to
either governmental intervention on their behalf or to compensation if the government fails
to act.”).
205. Id. at 349.
206. Id. at 347.
632 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:603
Takings Clause is justified.207 Indeed, Professor Serkin contends,
“the government can violate the Constitution by failing to take
affirmative steps to change preexisting law or by failing to protect
property from the application of preexisting law.”208 Similarly,
Professor Timothy Mulvaney asserts that “there are very excep-
tional instances where the state’s non-enforcement of existing regu-
latory safeguards and obligations rises to the level of fundamental
unfairness and injustice absent compensation.”209
Distinguishing between action and inaction and between tort and
taking is a difficult task,210 and any attempt at a clear dichotomy
breaks down at some point. For example, in St. Bernard Parish
Gov’t v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims found that the
Army Corps of Engineers had made policy decisions not to correct
active problems with the MR-GO.211
Furthermore, by instructing courts to weigh the effects of addi-
tional “risk-increasing and risk-decreasing government actions,”212
this Note’s proposed causation framework avoids creating a regime
that too quickly results in governmental liability. This will avoid
creating negative incentives for the government to avoid any action
for fear of tort liability.213
B. Too Much Deference to the Federal Government?
Alternatively, one may instead criticize the Note’s proposed cau-
sation framework for even considering additional “risk-increasing
and risk-decreasing government actions”214 in the first place. As the
St. Bernard Parish plaintiffs argued, their “properties would not
207. Id. Indeed, “[s]ometimes the distinction between action and inaction entirely breaks
down,” and “focusing too narrowly on an affirmative-act requirement can obscure the impo-
sition of real and cognizable harm.” Id. at 373-74.
208. Id. at 354.
209. Timothy M. Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, 59 B.C. L. REV. 145, 148 (2018)
(emphasis added).
210. See Zellmer, supra note 30, at 201; see also Mulvaney, supra note 209, at 148; Serkin,
supra note 204, at 373-74.
211. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687, 721-22 (2015), rev’d, 887
F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The Army Corps’ policy was to allow bank erosion of the MR-GO
to continue unabated.”).
212. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1365.
213. See supra Part IV.C.
214. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1365.
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have been flooded by Katrina if [the MR-GO] had never been
built.”215 Therefore, perhaps this Note’s proposed causation frame-
work gives the federal government too much leeway.
However, this Note instructs courts to weigh each additional gov-
ernmental project’s relation to the primary project at issue and the
time that has elapsed between each project’s construction. The
framework thus avoids creating a regime under which the federal
government “cannot lose.”216 Moreover, instructing courts to avoid
bright-line rules from the start and to conduct fact-specific, case-by-
case inquiries217 will give courts the necessary flexibility to avoid
arbitrary and unjust results.
In sum, the Note’s proposed causation framework balances com-
peting interests between the federal government and private land-
owners. The framework also incentivizes the federal government to
take proactive steps toward combatting the malicious effects of
rising sea levels, while avoiding bright-line rules and giving courts
the necessary flexibility to avoid unjust results.
CONCLUSION
Hurricanes and other severe storms have significantly damaged
private property.218 In the instance where a failed governmental
infrastructure project worsens the effects of flood damages,219 a
private citizen may want to bring suit to win at least partial com-
pensation.
Due to substantial tort immunity granted to the federal govern-
ment, litigants have little chance at succeeding on any tort claim
against the federal government.220 However, under the Tucker
Act,221 the federal government is not automatically immune from
takings claims.222 As such, in recent years, landowners have sought
recovery from the federal government for their damages by alleging
215. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 140, at 29.
216. Id.
217. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 26-27, 37 (2012).
218. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
220. See supra Part I.A.
221. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012).
222. See supra Part I.B.
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that by inducing temporary flooding, the federal government ef-
fected an inverse-condemnation taking compensable under the Fifth
Amendment.223
In Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that courts may not categorically dismiss
takings claims within this realm and instead must apply fact-
specific inquiries in each case.224 Given the Supreme Court’s pro-
scription against bright-line rules and categorical dismissals,
litigants will likely continue to bring such takings claims in federal
court.225
One essential element of inverse takings claims that arise from
government-induced flooding is causation. The Supreme Court did
not address causation in its Arkansas Game decision,226 and courts
have since employed divergent causation frameworks.227 This Note
suggests a causation framework that adheres to guidance from both
the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, but that also offers
more predictability for litigants moving forward.
This Note contends that federal courts should apply a fact-
specific, case-by-case analysis that weighs certain factors to assess
“whether the totality of the government’s actions caused the
injury.”228 Specifically, courts should weigh (1) additional “risk-
increasing and risk-decreasing government actions,”229 (2) their
relation to the primary infrastructure project that allegedly induced
flooding,230 and (3) the time that has elapsed between each addi-
tional project’s construction. Courts should grant the federal gov-
ernment more deference the closer that the additional project
relates to the primary project that induced flooding. Further, the
federal government should receive less deference the longer the time
that has elapsed between construction of government infrastructure
projects.
223. See supra Part III.
224. 568 U.S. 23, 31, 37 (2012).
225. See supra Part II.
226. See 568 U.S. at 40.
227. See supra Part III.
228. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
229. Id.
230. See id. at 1366 (“When the government takes actions that are directly related to pre-
venting the same type of injury on the same property where the damage occurred, such action
must be taken into account even if the two actions were not the result of the same project.”).
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The Note’s proposed causation framework offers courts flexibility
to avoid arbitrary and unjust results, but still offers predictable
factors that litigants can look to in every case.231 Moreover, the
causation framework balances competing interests between the
federal government and private landowners, and incentivizes the
federal government to take proactive steps towards preventing flood
damages and protecting private property.232 In light of both rising
sea levels233 and the Supreme Court’s Arkansas Game decision that
will encourage litigants to continue to bring such takings claims,234
it is essential that lower courts develop a consistent and predictable
causation framework. This Note’s proposed causation framework
advances the purposes of the Takings Clause235 while still incen-
tivizing the federal government to take positive action.
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